In
the philosophy of science there is a debate on the side of scientific realism
and those who are opposite to it, namely antirealism or instrumentalism.
There
is a fairly classic debate in philosophy on two opposing camps. The next debate
took place on the realism and idealism camps. Realism argues that there is a
physical world that is independent of human assumptions and perceptions.
Idealism rejects this view, and claims that the physical world depends on human
assumptions and perceptions. To most people the possibility of realism sounds
more plausible than idealism. Realism seems more compatible with common sense
because the facts out there are actually waiting to be discovered.
The
differences of opinion on realism and idealism are also included in the
metaphysical discussion. The focus of this paper is more specifically on the
debate in the context of the philosophy of science, which from certain factors
has a wedge with the metaphysical debate. The debate in the philosophy of
science takes place on the side of scientific realism and on the opposite side
of it, namely antirealism or instrumentalism.
Then
what is scientific realism (or scientific realism)? Realism has the idea that
science aims to provide a correct description of the world. So, a good
scientific theory is one that describes the world too much (Okasha 2016: p.
55). To clarify our understanding of scientific realism, we will see further
understanding from three aspects, namely: ontological or metaphysical factors,
semantic factors, and epistemological factors.
Ontologically,
scientific realism relies on the inspiration that there is a world that does
not depend on the mind, which science investigates. Semantically, scientific
realism is based on the idea that all claims about scientific entities
(including processes, characteristics or properties, relations) have a value
that can be determined as true or false. Epistemologically, scientific realism
holds on to the inspiration that scientific/theoretical claims are claims that
contain knowledge about the world or knowledge that contains descriptions of
the world (Chakravartty 2017).
In
contrast to scientific realism, antirealists have the idea that the object of
science is to arrive at a reasonably empirical theory, in the sense of being
able to correctly predict the results of experiments and observations. In other
words, for antirealists, the question of whether a theory is too descriptive of
the world is unimportant.
This
difference of opinion on realism and anti-realism is getting sharper when
examining what are called unobservable entities. Take for example suppose that
in physics, physics has reached the stage where it mentions entities like
atoms, electrons, quarks. Such entities cannot be seen directly, in the sense
that they are not supported by tools. The realist group argues that the
physical theory that examines subsequent entities is a theory that is too
descriptive of the world (Okasha 2016: p. 55).
For
anti-realists, these entities are only understood as an entity that helps
predict the observed phenomena. In an attempt to be more aware, we take for
example the kinetic theory of gases. This theory essentially proves that each
volume of gas has a number of moving entities.
This
entity refers to a molecule which is also an unobservable entity. From this
theory we can take some consequences, suppose that when a hot air balloon is
placed in the sun it will explode. Why did that happen? because of the increase
in temperature in the balloon.
Returning
to anti-realism, according to him, whether the air in the balloon contains
moving molecules or not is not an important case. The important thing about the
theory is because it can predict observations or because it predicts that if a
balloon is placed in the sun it will explode. Therefore, antirealism is often
labeled as instrumentalism because for instrumentalism, scientific theory is
only used as an instrument that helps identify and predict the observed
phenomena.
One
of the inspirations that helped antirealists was the inspiration that proved
that we cannot gain knowledge of unobservable entities, because they are beyond
human reach. The pessimistic idea, if we draw it out, originates from
empiricism which proves that human knowledge is limited to what can be
experienced (Okasha 2016: p. 56).
Another
idea on the anti-realist side comes from the logical positivism group. The
ontological beliefs and questions held by scientific realism about a world
independent of human assumptions are nonsense and meaningless. The discussion
about how the relationship between science and reality is a discussion that is
considered a waste of time. For this group, scientific propositions are said to
be meaningful insofar as they refer to and can be interpreted in terms of
experienced sensations. Like empiricism, this group holds that unobservable
entities are beyond our reach. Language and assumptions cannot go that far
(Godfrey-Smith 2003: pp. 180-181).
Having
seen a little difference of opinion between the two groups, we now come to the
section on what arguments support the position of scientific realism. The first
argument is the'no
miracle argument'or
argument without magic. Theories that presuppose unobservable entities are
empirically successful, in the sense that they can lead to good predictions of
macroscopic phenomena. In addition, these theories are also successfully
applied in technology.
From
the explanation above, the argument without miracles proves that it would be an
extraordinary coincidence if unobservable entities such as electrons and atoms
were considered to not exist, while on the other hand the theory that
presupposes these entities could predict macroscopic phenomena accurately and
successfully was applied. in technology. In other words, these unobservable
entities must be considered too present if they are not to witness the
successful prediction and application of science in technology as a miracle
(Okasha 2016: p. 59).
An
argument without magic can be expressed more in the following form:
P
The
best explanation for the fact P is that Q is true
Therefore,
Q is true
P
refers to the fact that science can predict phenomena accurately and is
successfully applied to technology. Whereas"Q”refers to unobservable entities as
being too existent, not merely useful entities insofar as it can predict the
common phenomenon with accuracy. Put another way, the best explanation for
successful prediction and application is due to the subsequent existence of
unobserved entities (Rosenberg and McIntyre 2020: pp. 141-142).
The
second argument is about the difference between observable and unobservable
entities. As far as we take it for granted that chairs, desks, and laptops are
observable entities, electrons, atoms, and quarks are unobservable entities.
However, in reality the next difference is quite problematic philosophically.
Further debates are also in principle unlikely to be made together firmly.
Why
is this argument said to help the position of scientific realism? Because
anti-realists argue that science cannot give us knowledge of unobservable
entities, which implicitly assumes there is a clear distinction between what is
observed and what is not. If this distinction cannot be expressed consciously
and satisfactorily, then antirealism is in a rather problematic position
(Okasha 2016: pp. 62-63).
In
response to this second argument, anti-realists can evade by arguing that this
argument merely shows the ambiguity of the meaning of observable and
unobservable entities. The ambiguity of meaning for the antirealist does not
imply that the distinction between observable and unobservable entities does
not exist. However, anti-realists still need to provide additional explanations
as to why knowledge of unobservable entities is impossible.
Thus
a brief explanation of scientific realism and the response to it. Of course,
the two arguments that are referred to as supporting the position of scientific
realism have various responses and challenges.
Bibliography
- Chakravartty, Anjan. 2017. “Scientific Realism.” Plato Stanford. Retrieved (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/).
- Godfrey Smith, Peter. 2003. An Introduction to The Philosophy of Science: Theory and Reality. London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Okasha, Samir. 2016. Philosophy Of Science: A Very Short Introduction. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
- Rosenberg, Alex, and Lee McIntyre. 2020. Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction. New York: Routledge.
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